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There remains considerable controversy about how the brain operates. This review
focuses on brain activity rather than just structure and on concepts of action and
actionability rather than truth conditions. Neural Communication is reviewed as a crucial
aspect of neural encoding. Consequently, logical inference is superseded by neural
simulation. Some remaining mysteries are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
This Frontiers project on “Representation in the Brain” is extremely timely. Despite significant
theoretical and experimental advances, there is still considerable confusion on the topic. Wikipedia
says: Representation: “A mental representation (or cognitive representation), in philosophy
of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science,” is a hypothetical internal
cognitive symbol that represents external reality, or else a mental process that makes use of such a
symbol: a formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of information, together with
a specification of how the system does this. “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_representation,
August/8/2016.”
The definition above presupposes a separation between data and process that is true of books
and computers but is utterly false in neural systems. In this article we use the term “encoding”
instead of “representation”. The brain is not a set of areas that represent things, but rather a network
of circuits that do things. It is the activity of the brain, not just its structure, that matters. This
immediately brings focus on actions and thus circuits. This paper will not attempt to describe (the
myriad) particular brain circuits but will focus on the mechanisms for coordination among the
local information transfer and areas and circuits missing in most discussions of “representation.”
For concreteness, let’s start with a simple, well-known, neural circuit, the knee-jerk reflex shown
in Figure 1. We are mainly concerned with the simplicity of this circuit; there is a single connection
in the spinal cord that converts sensory input to action. The knee-jerk reflex is behaviorally
important for correcting a potential stumble while walking upright. The doctor’s tap reduces
tension in the upper leg muscle and this is detected by stretch receptor in the muscle spindle,
sending neural spike signals to the spinal cord. The downward spike signals directly cause the
muscle to contract and the leg to “jerk.” Not shown here are the many other circuit connections
that support coordination of the two legs, voluntary leg jerking, etc.
There are several general lessons to be learned from this simple example. Essentially everyone
now agrees that neurons are the foundation of encoding knowledge in the brain. But, as the example
above shows, it is the activity of neurons, not just their connections, that supports the functionality.
The example involved motor activity, but the basic point is equally valid for perception, thought,
and language, they are all based on neural activity. There are three essential considerations in
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FIGURE 1 | Knee-jerk Reflex Circuit.
discussing neural circuits – the computational properties
of individual neurons, the structure of networks and the
communication mechanisms involved.
Of these three, it is communication mechanisms that have
been studied the least and this fact is the basis for the
subtitle “no representation without communication”. “Neural
Communication and Representation,” below is a brief review
of what has been called the neural code (Feldman, 2010a).
Considerations from neural computation also constrain possible
answers to traditional questions like localist vs. distributed
representations. Actionability and Simulation goes further and
directly addresses the consequences of accepting action and
actionability as the core brain function that needs to be explained.
The final Conclusions section also considers remaining unsolved
mysteries involving the mind-brain problem, some of which are
ubiquitous in everyday experience
NEURAL COMMUNICATION AND
REPRESENTATION
One key question concerns the basic mechanisms of neural
communication. It is now accepted that the dominant method is
transmission of voltage spikes along axons and through synapses
that are connections to downstream neural processes. Neural
spikes are an evolutionary ancient development that remains
nature’s main technique for fast long distance information
passing (Meech and Mackie, 2007). Other neural communication
mechanisms are either extremely local (e.g., gap junctions) or
much slower (e.g., hormones). Neural spikes serve a wide range
of functions.
Much of the chemistry underlying neural spikes goes back
even earlier (Katz, 2007; Meech and Mackie, 2007). The earliest
use of spiking neurons is to signal coordinated action as in
the swimming of jellyfish. This kind of direct action remains
one of the main functions of neural spikes as suggested by
Figure 1. Due to the common chemistry, all neural spikes
are of the same duration and size (Katz, 2007; Meech and
Mackie, 2007). The basic method of neural information transfer
is direct –the information depends on which neurons are linked.
Most of the information sent by a sensory neural spike train
is based on the sending unit. For output, the result of motor
control signaling is largely determined by which fibers are
targeted. The other variable is timing; there is a wide range
of variation in the firing rate and conduction time of neural
spikes.
The other factor on neural computation is resource limitations
(Lennie, 2003). The most obvious resource constraint for neural
action/decision is time. Many actions need to be fast even at
the expense of some accuracy. Some neural systems evolved
to meet remarkable timing constraints. Bats and owls make
distinctions that correspond to timing differences at the 10 µs
level -much faster than neural response times. A second key
resource is energy; neural firing is metabolically costly (Lennie,
2003) and brains evolved to conserve energy while meeting
performance requirements. The three factors of accuracy, timing,
and resources are the elements of a function that conditions
neural computation.
We can show why it is not feasible for one neuron to send
an abstract symbol (as in ASCII code) to another as a spike
pattern (Feldman, 1988). It is known experimentally that the
firing of sensory (e.g., visual) neurons is a function of multiple
variables, often intensity, position, velocity, orientation, color, etc.
It would take an extremely long message to transmit all this as
an ASCII like code and neural firing rates are too slow for this,
even omitting the stochastic nature of neural spikes. Even if such
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a message were somehow encoded and transmitted downstream,
it would require a complex computation to decode it and
combine the result with the symbolic messages of neighboring
cells and then build a new symbolic message for the further levels.
Language is a symbolic system that is processed by the brain, but
nothing at all like abstract symbols occurs at the individual unit
level.
In the past, there have been debates about whether neural
representations were basically punctuate with a “grandmother
cell” (Bowers, 2009) for each concept of interest. The alternative
was basically holographic (with each item encoded by a
pattern involving all the units in a large population). It
has been understood for decades (Feldman, 1988) that
neither extreme could be realized in the neural systems of
nature.
Having just a single unit coding the element of interest
(concept) is impractical for many reasons. The clearest is that the
known death of cells would cause concepts to vanish. Also, the
firing of individual units is probabilistic and would not be a stable
representation. It is easy to see that there are not nearly enough
units in the brain to capture all the possible combinations of sizes,
motions, shapes, colors, etc., that we recognize, let alone all the
non-visual concepts. The grandmother cell story was always a
straw man— using a modest number (∼10) units per concept
could overcome all these difficulties.
The holographic alternative was originally more popular
because it used the techniques of statistical mechanics. But
it is equally implausible. This is easy to see informally and
was proved as early as (Willshaw et al., 1969). Suppose a
system should represent a collection of concepts (e.g., words)
as a pattern of activity over some number M (say 10,000,000)
neurons. The key problem is cross-talk: if multiple words are
simultaneously active, how can the system avoid interference
among their respective patterns. Willshaw et al. (1969) showed
that the best solution is to have each concept represented by
the activity of only about logM units, which would be about 24
neurons in our example. There are many other computational
problems with holographic models (Feldman, 1988). For example
if a concept required a pattern over all M units, how would
that concept combine with other concepts without cross-talk.
Even more basically, there is no way that a holographic
representation could be transmitted from one brain circuit to
another.
There is a wide range of converging experimental evidence
(Quiroga et al., 2008; Bowers, 2009) showing that neural encoding
relies on a modest number (10–100) of units. There is also some
overlap—the same unit can be involved in the representation of
different items. For several reasons, not all of them technical,
some papers continue to refer to these structured representations
as “sparse population codes.” A much more appropriate term
would be redundant circuits.
There is now a general consensus on the basis of neural spike
signaling and encoding. There are a number of specialized neural
structures involving delicate timing. The relative time of spike
arrival is also important for plasticity. But the main mechanism
for neural signaling is frequency encoding in functional circuits
of low redundancy.
ACTIONABILITY AND SIMULATION
Given that knowledge is encoded in the brain as active
circuits, the next big question concerns the nature of this
embodied knowledge. The key idea is that living things and
their brains evolved to act in the physical and social world.
Action is evolutionarily much older than symbolic thought,
belief, etc., and is also developmentally much earlier in people.
Sensory actions loops like the knee-jerk reflex (Figure 1)
significantly pre-date neurons and are crucial even for single
celled animals such as amoeba (Katz, 2007). Only living
things act (in our sense); natural forces, mechanisms, etc. are
said to act by metaphorical extension (Lakoff and Johnson,
1980).
Fitness is the technical term for nature’s assessment of agents’
actions in context. Natural selection assures that creatures with
sufficiently bad choices of actions do not survive and reproduce.
The term actionability has been defined as an organism’s internal
assessment of its available actions in context (Feldman and
Narayanan, 2014). Of course, such an internal calculation will
rarely be optimal for fitness, but evolution selects systems where
the match is good enough.
Actions, in this formulation, include persistent change of
internal state: learning, memory, world models, self-concept, etc.
In animals, perception is best-fit, active, and utility/affordance
based (Parker and Newsome, 1998). The external world (e.g.,
other agents) is not static so internal models need simulation.
Simulation involves imagining actions and estimating their
likely consequences before actually entailing the risks of trying
them in the real world (Bergen, 2013). Both actionability
assessment and simulation rely on good (but not veridical)
internal models. This is another fundamental property of neural
encoding.
Another important issue concerns the roles of rules, including
logical rules in the brain. Once a simulation has been done
successfully, people can cache (remember) the result as a rule
and thus shortcut a costly simulation. Search in a symbolic
model can be viewed as a form of simulation. Learning
generalizations of symbolic rules is a crucial process and not well
understood.
Communication is an important form of action and is needed
for cooperation, as discussed in Neural Communication and
Representation. Even single-celled animals, like some amoebas,
rely on pheromones for survival, particularly for organizing into
stable structures in times of environmental stress (Shorey, 2013).
Higher plants and animals rely on communication actions for
many life functions. And, of course, language is a characterizing
trait of people. Much of what we know and what we need
to learn about “representation in the brain” is concerned with
language.
Actionability, not non-tautological truth, is what an
agent/animal can actually compute. We have no privileged
access to external truth or to our own internal state. This entails
the operationality of all living things. In science, operationalism
states that theories should be evaluated for their explanatory
and predictive power, not as assertions of the reality of their
terms, e.g., electrons. Living things incorporate structures that
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model the external and internal milieus to enhance fitness.
Evolution constrains these structures to be consistent with
reality.
The basic actionability story applies to all living things, but
there are profound differences between different species. One
crucial divide/cline is volitional action and communication –
the boundary is not clear, but birds are above the line;
protozoans, plants below. We assume that, in nature, neurons
are necessary for volition (Damasio, 1999). Volitional actions
have automatic components and influence, e.g., speech. For
example, deciding to talk is volitional; the details of articulation
are automatic.
Learning is obviously a foundation of intelligent activity
and also important in much simpler organisms. The current
revolution in big data, deep learning, etc., can help provide
insights for this enterprise as well as many others, but is not
a model for the mechanisms under study. Structure learning
remains to be understood. Observational learning without a
model is influenced by the observer’s ability to act in the situation
(Iani et al., 2013). In Nature, there is no evidence for tabula-rasa
learning and massive evidence against it.
Language is a hallmark of human intelligence and its
representation in the brain is of major importance. From our
actionability perspective, the crucial question is the neural
encoding of meaning. A tradition dating literally back to the
Greeks identifies meaning with “truth” as defined in formal
logics. This historical fact wouldn’t matter except that the
same definition of meaning dominates much current work
in formal linguistics, philosophy, and computer science. But
action is evolutionarily much older than symbolic thought,
belief, etc., and is also developmentally much earlier in
people.
Decades of inter-disciplinary work suggests that the definition
of meaning should be expressed in an action-oriented formalism
(Narayanan, 1999) that maps directly to embodied mechanisms
(Feldman, 2005). For example, the meaning of a word like
“push” is captured formally as an action schema that captures
the preconditions and resources needed for the action as well
as the possible results of the action. Furthermore, all actions
inherit from a common control schema (Narayanan, 1999)
that models general aspects of action including completion,
interrupts, repetition, etc. This action formalism is multi-modal:
describing execution, recognition, and planning as well as
language.
In addition, the meaning of a word like “push” is assumed
to engage neural circuits that produce pushing behavior in
people and other animals. There are wide ranging findings
that indeed words and images about actions do activate much
of the same circuitry as carrying out the action (Garagnani
and Pulvermüller, 2016). This is strong evidence about the
encoding of actions, action images, and action language in the
brain. A further extension of actionability theory accounts for
the meaning of metaphorical meanings of words like push in
examples like “push for a promotion” (Lakoff and Johnson,
1980). Metaphorical mappings are modeled as mappings from
some target domain (here, employment) to an embodied source
domain. A remarkable range of phenomena are explained by
this theory and, again, there is strong neural support for the
connection (Bergen, 2013).
This brings us back to simulation, which was discussed
earlier as being necessary for modeling the response of
external environment (including other agents) to one’s
actions. Some automatic simulations (like dreams) are well
understood in mammals, but people rely upon volitional
(intentional, purposeful) simulation for many functions
including planning and language (Feldman, 2005). Some
remarkable new experiments (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013) suggest
that rodents might exhibit volitional simulation, but this remains
controversial.
More generally, simulation is a cornerstone of an extensive
effort on language theory, embodiment, and application.
Volitional simulation has been proposed as the mechanism of
planning, mind-reading, etc. (Bergen, 2013). With an appropriate
formalism, simulation can yield both causal and predictive
inferences (Pearl, 2000). Results of simulations can be cached
(remembered) and generalized as rules. The NTL theory of
language and thought entails additional mechanisms including
construction grammar, mental spaces, mappings, etc. (Feldman,
2010b).
CONCLUSIONS AND MYSTERIES
This Frontiers project on “Representation in the Brain” is
extremely timely; despite recent theoretical and experimental
advances, there is still considerable confusion on the topic.
As is often the case, part of the problem arises from the use
of anachronistic terms like “representation” to describe neural
computation. There are also surviving revivals of old theories
(like holographic memory and field theory) that are incompatible
with current findings. But for the most part, there is a good
scientific consensus on what could be called a standard theory
of neural computation (Parker and Newsome, 1998). This is
based on the activity of individual neurons that participate in
multiple complex circuits and communicate primarily through
spikes transmitted through axons to synapses with processes of
downstream cells.
In addition to our improved understanding of the
computational primitives of the brain, there are promising
advances on theories and experiments at the functional level.
The ancient idea that meaning should be equated with logical
truth is being replaced by theories that emphasize the function of
brains in interacting with the physical and social environments
(Kahneman, 2011). In a related development, the idea of
language and thought as logical deduction is giving way to theory
and experiment grounded in bodily experience and simulation
(Bergen, 2013).
However, there are fundamental questions on neural
computation that remain mysteries in that there is no plausible
theory to account for them. The general mind-body problem is
known to be intractable and currently mysterious (Chalmers,
1996). This is one of many deep problems, including quantum
phenomena, etc., that are universally agreed to be beyond
the current purview of science. But all of these famous
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unsolved problems are either remote from everyday experience
(complementarity, dark matter) or are hard to even define sharply
(consciousness, free will, etc.).
There are also problematic ordinary behaviors–recent work
(Feldman, 2016) describes some obvious problems in vision that
arise every time that we open our eyes and yet are demonstrably
incompatible with current theories of neural computation,
including those presented in this article. The focus was on two
related phenomena, known as the neural binding problem and
the illusion of a stable visual world. I, among many others, have
struggled with these issues for more than 50 years and I now
believe that they are both unsolvable within current neuroscience.
By considering some basic facts about how the brain processes
image input, (Feldman, 2016) shows that there are not nearly
enough brain neurons to compute what we experience as vision.
We imagine that we perceive an entire scene at full resolution,
but only about 1 degree in the fovea is encoded that precisely.
However, the area of visual cortex that encodes the fovea is much
too large to be replicated ∼400 times to fully encode a full scene
in detail.
I suggest that these facts should induce humility about the
prospects for our current neuroscience to yield a complete
reductionist account of even concrete aspects of vision and other
thought processes. So, “representation in the brain” remains one
of the central scientific questions of our time, if not of all time.
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